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Corporate restructuring
The walking dead
Dec 13th 2007
From The Economist print edition
With credit conditions tighter, more companies will be pursued by their creditors. But restructuring is becoming increasingly complex, contentious and costly
信贷紧缩，债权人逼宫。但重组也变得吃力不讨好。
MENTION the name Schefenacker to the London bankers, lawyers and advisers who specialise in turning around insolvent companies, and you are likely to be greeted with knowing smiles. Schefenacker, which makes mirrors for carmakers such as BMW and Mercedes, almost went bust late last year. In April it emerged from a tortuous restructuring, during which it moved its headquarters from Germany to Britain to take advantage of the flexible insolvency laws there. Along the way, its debt burden was cut by 47% and its founder had to give up three-quarters of his shares to creditors.
一旦跟伦敦那些专门从事破产企业重整的银行家、律师或顾问提及雪弗莱克（Schefenacker），他们可能会给你一个会意的微笑。雪弗莱克是一个车镜制造商，宝马（BMW）和梅塞德斯（Mercedes）等汽车制造商皆是它的客户，去年几乎破产。为了利用英国灵活的破产法，今年四月雪弗莱克进行了一次迂回的重构，将总部从德国搬到英国。
These things happen in business. But the reason for the gleam in the eyes of the London specialists is Schefenacker's bill for legal and advisory work: well over euro40m ($59m). Compared with the &121m ($242m) that British Energy paid between 2003 and 2005 to its advisers when it got into trouble, this might seem small change. But Schefenacker, with total debts of euro429m, was a tiddler next to British Energy. The nuclear-power company's restructuring involved &16.2 billion-worth of liabilities (&1.2 billion of debt and &15 billion for storing, reprocessing and disposing of spent nuclear fuel and for decommissioning power stations).
这些本来是商业事件。伦敦重组专家眼中闪过的异彩是因为雪弗莱克支付给律师团和顾问团的金额高达4000万欧元，相当于5900万美元。也许跟英国能源公司在2003年到2005年——当时英国能源公司陷入困境——支付给它的顾问团的121百万欧元（相当于242百万美元）相比，那只是个零头。但跟英国能源公司相比，雪弗莱克只是一条小鱼，它的总债务只有429百万欧元。而英国能源公司的改组涉及价值162亿欧元的债务（12亿欧元的负债和用于核燃料储存、再加工、处理及核电站封闭的150亿欧元）。
Expect more Schefenackers, courtesy of the credit crunch. As America's subprime-mortgage crisis has taken hold, credit conditions have suddenly tightened. In addition, rich economies look set to slow down—perhaps uncomfortably abruptly. The rate of corporate bankruptcies therefor and to stave off insolvency, many companies will have to reach agreement with their creditors on a restructuring of their debts.
在信贷紧缩的情况下，雪弗莱克开的价还是相当有诚意的。美国爆发的次贷危机，让信贷环境一下子严峻起来。此外，发达国家的经济很突然地开始放缓。因此，企业的破产率必将上升。为了避免破产，很多企业不得不同意债权人关于改组企业债务的提议。
Since mid-September an index of the cost of protection against defaults by low-rated American companies has soared (see chart 1). Moody's, a rating agency, predicts that the proportion of low-rated companies that default on their borrowing will rise from 1% to 4.2% within a year. And BDO Stoy Hayward, an accounting firm, thinks that in 2008 the number of British businesses becoming insolvent will go up by 9%, to a five-year high.
从九月中旬起，美国低信用级别企业违约保护成本指数一路上升。评级机构穆迪预计，低信用级别企业拖欠借款的百分比在年内将从1%上升到4.2%。柏德豪会计师事务所认为，2008年英国破产的企业数量将会增长9%，是五年来的新高。
However, not all firms that go bust will be as lucky as Schefenacker, which at least kept its business more or less intact. Many firms undergoing restructuring could end up like corporate zombies, unable either to revive or to die while their creditors haggle over what should be done.
Changes to bankruptcy laws in both America and Europe in recent years ought to have made it easier to revitalise or kill off ailing companies. But companies' finances have become much harder to unravel. Offered cheap money on easy terms, companies—just like consumers and homeowners—have borrowed far more than they used to. The type and complexity of debt have grown too, as have the range and number of creditors.
但是，并不是所有破产的公司都有雪弗莱克那样的好运气，至少雪弗莱克基本上完整地保留了自己的业务。很多正在改组的公司很可能变成企业僵尸，既不能重现生机，也不会消亡——因为他们的债权人还在为公司应该做什么而吵个不停
All this has increased the potential for conflict when a company becomes insolvent. A high level of debt, relative to a company's assets, means that a good proportion of creditors will be left with nothing. Because any restructuring plan has to be approved by a majority of creditors, the ability of a group of lenders to hold out for a better deal has grown. Some institutions will have taken bets that a company will go bust, and so stand to make money if a restructuring fails. This sets the stage for long, fierce battles between different classes of creditor.
所有的这些，增加了企业破产时发生冲突的可能性。高资产负债率意味，一旦离开债权人，企业就什么都不是了。由于所有改组方案都必须获得多数债权人的支持，所以债权人对改组的影响力得到加强。一些机构还会打赌某个企业将会破产，当企业改组失败时，他们就能赢钱。因此不同阵营的债权人之间，会进行长期而激烈的角力。
The best bankruptcy破产圣经Chapter 11 of America's bankruptcy code is widely regarded as the global gold standard for bankruptcy law. It protects a company from its creditors and allows its managers to stay in control until they can come up with a plan to reorganise the business (in contrast to Chapter 7, which deals with liquidating companies outright and selling their assets to repay lenders). After a Chapter 11 filing, a firm can continue borrowing money to keep going. Suppliers or customers cannot terminate contracts with it simply because of the filing. “Corporate bankruptcy in America has now lost any stigma it might have once had,” says David Heller, a Chicago-based partner in Latham & Watkins, a law firm.
《美国破产法》的第十一章被普遍认为是全球破产法的黄金准则。破产法十一章让破产企业免受债权人的追索，并允许经营者继续控制企业直到债务人和债权人就企业重组方案达成一致（而第七章却是，即时清算企业并变卖企业资产偿还债权人）。破产法第十一章还规定，（申请破产）企业能继续借债保持企业运转，而且供应商和客户也不能中止跟（破产）企业的合同。瑞生国际律师事务所在芝加哥的合伙人大卫·海勒说：“以前在美国破产的企业会被打上污点，现在不会了。”
Since its introduction in 1978, the law (and the bankruptcy code in general) has spawned a huge industry of lawyers, advisers and even trade journals. Creditors argued that it was too soft on managers, pointing out that executives could take years to draw up a reorganisation plan while creditors could not put forward plans of their own. Inefficient companies could gain a substantial advantage in Chapter 11, because they could continue in business without having to service their debts. A classic example is the American airline industry: in 2005 four of the six big carriers were operating under Chapter 11.
从1978年被通过至今，破产法已经孕生了一个包含律师、顾问甚至交易日报在内的产业。债权人认为这样对经营者太过仁慈。他们指出，经营者也许会拖上几年时间去制定重组方案，而自己却只能束手而立。低效率的企业能从破产法的第十一章得到实质性的好处，因为他们无需偿还债务也能继续经营。美国航空运输业就是一个经典的例子：在2005年，六家大航空公司中有四家是在破产法十一章的庇护下经营的。
Changes made in 2005 were intended to speed up reorganisation by in effect handing more power to creditors. Companies now have only 18 months to file a restructuring plan of their own, and the process of bankruptcy has become more expensive. Bosses also have less scope to award themselves large pay rises during bankruptcy.
2005年（国会）对破产法进行了修订，意图通过加快重组分案的生效，赋予债权人更多的权利。现在，（破产）企业单独制订重组方案的时间只有18个月，而且申请破产的代价更加高昂。同时，经营者在企业破产时给自己攫取好处的机会也变小了。
If Chapter 11 has been thought of as too lenient, insolvency law in Europe has been notoriously severe. Companies with only short-term cash problems often ended up being liquidated. Directors were required by law in some countries to file for insolvency mere weeks after their companies became unable to pay their debts.
如果认为破产法11章太过仁慈，那么英国的破产法就相当严厉了。即便企业只有短期资金困难，通常情况下会被立即清算。有些国家的法律规定，在企业无力偿还债务之后，企业的经营者必须在几个星期内提出破产申请。
Some countries (Germany in 1999; France and Italy in 2005) have since introduced Chapter 11-style reforms. A European Union law introduced in 2002 has in effect made it easier for creditors and firms to seek insolvency in countries other than a company's official home.
一些国家已经采纳11章的修订版了（德国在1999；法国和意大利在2005年）。欧盟在2002年采纳并已经生效的的法律，让债权人和企业在欧盟申请破产比在企业所在国申请破产还要容易。
Often, as with Schefenacker, this has meant Britain. British insolvency law has long been supportive of creditors whose debts are secured by companies' assets. Amendments in 2002, intended to give all creditors (not just secured ones) a fair hearing, have made little difference. One reason is simply that insolvent companies still ne usually, they can borrow only from secured creditors, who will inevitably dictate the terms of such loans. The lack of separate sources of finance for insolvent firms remains a weakness of the system in continental Europe too. In America firms in Chapter 11 can borrow far more easily.
对（为了避免破产的）雪弗莱克而言，这意味着它必须搬到英国。（注：根据查到的资料，英国并不采用欧盟破产法，甚至欧盟破产规则一度因为英国的反对而没有被通过。）英国破产法一向支持债权人的利益，规定债权由企业资产偿还。虽然2002年的英国破产法修正案给予所有债权人（而不单是受保护债权人）平等一致的追索权，但和之前的法案也没有多大的区别。原因很简单，申请破产的企业行使职能也是需要资金的；这些资金通常只能向受保护的债权人借取，贷款条约理所当然也只能由受保护的债权人决定。破产企业缺乏（和债权人）分离的资金来源是也是欧洲大陆破产法的一个漏洞。11章之下的美国公司就好过多了。
Chancery 法理与金融
All these legal changes could be rendered meaningless by the financial excesses of the past few years. As central banks around the world cut interest rates in the aftermath of the dotcom collapse and flooded the world with cheap money, companies found lenders queuing to offer them loans at very low interest rates. They were delighted to accept—and to play off one lender against another to get the easiest terms and lowest rates.
这些法律上的变更在过去几年发生的金融巨变面前显得毫无意义。在网络经济崩溃之后，世界各国的央行纷纷降低利率，注入低息资金。企业突然发现，想借钱给他们的人排开了队伍，而且还是低息的。企业很乐于接受这种情况，而且贷款人之间的竞争，让企业得到更加宽松的低息贷款。
Not surprisingly, debt levels rose sharply in both America and Europe. According to Standard & Poor's Leveraged Commentary & Data (S&P LCD), a research unit that tracks lending to low-grade companies, the total debt issued by American companies of that class as a share of their gross earnings rose from 4% in 2001 to 5.1% in the first nine months of this year. In Europe the ratio increased from 4% to 5.9% in the same period (see chart 2).
因此，美国和欧洲企业资产负债率的快速攀升并不让人意外。Leveraged Commentary & Data (S&P LCD)是标准普尔旗下的公司，负责跟踪低信用级别企业的借贷情况。S&P LCD的数据显示，低信用级别美国企业发行的债务总他们总的利润的份额从2001年的4%到今年前九个月的5.1%。而欧洲同期，这个数字从4%升到5%。
The character of lenders has changed too. Until the late 1990s the biggest creditors, especially in Europe, were banks, which had first claim on a defaulter's assets. The others were usually bondholders, who had to be satisfied with what was left after the banks had been paid.
贷款人的身份也发生了变化。直到20世纪90年代末，最大的贷款人（特别是在欧洲）一直是银行，对拖欠债务的企业有第一追索权。拥有第二追索权的是债券持有人，拥有银行清算完毕之后企业剩余资产的追索权。
With the enormous expansion in the number of institutional investors (those other than banks, such as hedge funds), all that has changed. Even when banks made loans, they tended to repackage them and sell them, as bonds, to institutions, freeing up scarce capital. According to S&P LCD, in America the share of non-investment-grade loans held by institutional investors rose by 40 percentage points to 82% between 1999 and the year to September 2007. In Europe that share climbed from 4% to 55% (see chart 3).
随着机构投资者数量的大幅膨胀（银行之外的投资者，比如对冲基金），一切都变了。就算银行贷款，也趋向于把贷款重新包装之后以债券的形式卖给机构投资者，以便自己稀缺的资金能够流动起来。S&P LCD指出，在美国，机构投资者持有的非投资级贷款份额，在1999年到2007年9月间，上升了40%，达到82%。在欧洲，这个数字从4%上升到55%。
Even smallish companies can now have dozens of debt holders. Several years ago, says Bob Hedger, of the Royal Bank of Scotland's restructuring department, the investors in any single deal used to be recognisable or small enough in number that he would know exactly whom to call in the relevant bank or fund. “When I look at the number of hedge funds who have entered the distressed market for debt in the past few years and now regularly hold the debt of distressed companies, many of the names are completely unfamiliar.”
甚至小公司也可能有几打债权人。几年前，苏格兰皇家银行重组部门的鲍勃·赫治（Bob Hedger）曾说，过去参与每宗交易的投资者他都认识，或者成交的金额太小以致他必须打电话给相关的银行或基金公司。“当我看着几年前进入低信用级别企业债务市场的对冲基金的数量，再对比一下目前持有这些债务的基金公司，会有一些不熟悉。”
With the new investors has come a bewildering variety of loans. Instead of a short chain—secured creditors, unsecured creditors and shareholders—now there are senior or first-lien creditors (who have first dibs on a company's assets), second-lien creditors (who also have claims over the assets of a company, but who get paid only after first-lien creditors), mezzanine creditors, senior subordinated debt holders and subordinated debt holders. At the bottom of this caste system, as before, are the shareholders, who get any leftovers.
随着新投资者出现的，还有一系列让人眼花缭乱的贷款。拥有优先留置权的债权人（对企业债产有优先求偿权）、第二顺位留置权的债权人、夹层债权人、主要附属债务持有人和附属债务持有人（对企业资产有仅次于拥有优先留置权的债权人的求偿权）已经取代短链债权人——有追索权和无追索权的债权人和股东。在这个系统的底部，股东和以前一样只有最后的求偿权。
In the years of easy, plentiful credit, companies were able to demand looser conditions on their loans. Such conditions, known as covenants, typically specify limits on certain financial ratios, such as that of a company's earnings to its interest payments. If they are breached, creditors can force the company to fix its finances. Recently covenants have become so weak as to be ineffective. “There is a real risk that a company will default on payment obligations before it actually breaches its covenants,” according to Ian Field, a partner of Allen & Overy, a law firm, in London.
在早些年，由于大量信贷资金的存在，企业能够得到条件较宽松的贷款。这些条件，也就是条款，对某些财务比率进行了明确的限定，比如利息保障倍数。如果没有达到这些财务比率，债权人能够要求企业改善财务状况。近来的借款条款太过宽松，以致有等于无。安理国际律师事务所在伦敦的合伙人埃兰·弗尔德说，“风险是真实存在的，企业可能在它真正达成借款条款之前不履行偿还债务的义务。”
When the main “sponsor” or the biggest shareholder happens to be a private-equity fund, the terms of a loan sometimes allow the fund to repair breaches in a covenant by putting more money into the company. More often than not, however, this merely delays the inevitable. “When the company finally comes to the table [to implement a restructuring], the level of financial distress is likely to be more severe and there will be less time to implement a successful restructuring,” says Mr Field. Even in America financing for bankrupt companies may become more difficult to obtain, simply because companies are laden with so much debt. Lenders might well avoid companies with few assets not already mortgaged to others.
当企业的主要“发起人”或者大股东刚好是私募股权基金，贷款合同有时允许私募股权基金以注入更多资金的形式去达成贷款条款。但多数情况下，注资也只是推迟了企业破产的时间。弗尔德说，“当企业落到重组的地步，原本就吃紧的财务状况会更加严峻，去完成成功的重组的时间也就越少。”就算在美国，因为破产企业担负的债务实在太多了，企业的融资也会变得相当困难。贷款方不会选择那些没有多少资产而且已经将资产抵押出去的企业。
Games people play 破产游戏Diverse though they may be, almost all investors in a restructuring are of just two types. Many hedge funds are pure traders who buy debt cheaply and try to sell it as the price inches up, looking to make a quick buck. But there are often larger investors whose ultimate aim is to convert their debt to equity. These used to be mainly “vulture” funds, but now include a wide range of hedge funds and even specialised distressed-debt traders in large investment banks. When a company revives and its share price starts rising, such investors can sell their holdings for a handsome profit.
虽然投资者各有特色，但所有参与到企业重组的投资者几乎可以分成两种类型。很多对冲基金是纯粹的交易者，他们以低价买入债务，稍微加价之后卖出，为的是快速拉升价格。通常也有一些大投资者的最终目标是把持有的债务转换成股份。以前这么做的主要是秃鹰基金，不过现在也包括很多对冲基金甚至大型投资银行专门从事问题债券投资的交易者。当破产企业起来回生，企业的股票会一路飙升。投资者就能卖出他们持有的股份，获得可观的利人民代表大会。
The problem for other investors round the table is in telling which is which. To compound the problem, as news of a company's troubles spreads, the price of its bonds tends to jump because investors are trading in and out of them. “When I notice a fund buying up the debt of a company for 93 cents on the dollar I can be pretty sure that they want to convert their debt to equity at some point in the future,” says a banker. “It rarely makes sense to buy at that high a price for them to be satisfied with being paid off only at par [the full value of the bond].” So when talks start, several of those at the table probably want to end up owning some or all of the firm.
对其他参与企业债务重组的投资者来说，问题在于如何分辨投资者的类型。当某个企业陷入困境的消息传开时，由于投资者不断地买入卖出，该企业的债券的价格将会不断跳动。这会让其他投资者更难分辨。“当我看到有基金以93美分的价格大量买入某个企业的债券时，我敢肯定在他们打算将持有的债券在将来的某个时点上转换成股票。”有银行家说，“对他们来说，以高价买入企业债券是没有任何意义的，他们只满足于以债券面值的价格买入。”一旦这样的言论传开，一些参与重组的企业会将他们手中持有的一部分或者全部企业债券卖出。
That is when the games begin. In both Europe and America insolvencies are increasingly “pre-packaged”: creditors agree on a plan of restructuring before a formal insolvency. This can speed matters along. “Secondary investors, such as hedge funds, usually prefer a consensual out-of-court restructuring but will also have a ‘Plan B' if this cannot be achieved. Some form of pre-packaged insolvency has become increasingly popular as a Plan B over the last year or so,” says John Houghton, a partner at Latham & Watkins in London. In a “prepack” creditors have more control over the final outcome and run less risk of a fire sale of assets.
以上的情景经常发生在重组刚开始的时候。在欧洲和美国，破产越来越趋向于“预先包装”：在正常破产之前，债权人同意重组分案。这样可以加快相关事宜。瑞生国际律师事务所在伦敦的合伙人约翰·侯通说，“次要的债权人，像对冲基金，通常喜欢能让它们满意的庭外重组方案，但如果它们不满意，它们会提出代替的分案。大概是在去年，一些“预先包装”的破产分案已经成为受欢迎的代替分案。”“预先包装”让债权人更能控制最终的结果并在以较低的风险出售破产企业的资产。
However, prepacks are quick only if creditors can agree on them. The creditors who will be paid only part of what they are owed are the most important in any deal because they can hold out for more. Those lower down, who stand to get nothing, can be forced to accept a restructuring plan. But it may be hard even to work out what the company is worth—and that is what determines which creditors get paid.
但是，只有债权人同意了，预先包装方案才能被快速执行。债权人只能收回一部分的债务，但对每宗交易都是至关重要的，因为他们能比企业坚持得更久。排在债权人后面的，通常什么也得不到，只好接受重组分案。但清算出企业值多少钱是很困难的，因为那关系到债权人能收回多少投资。
In December 2006, a couple of months after Schefenacker began its restructuring journey, another car-parts company had ended its own, even longer insolvency adventure. Meridian Automotive System, a Michigan-based company with 4,700 employees, had filed for protection from its creditors under Chapter 11 in early 2005. As well as issuing unsecured bonds, Meridian had borrowed around $485m in first- and second-lien loans.
2006年12月，在雪弗莱克启动它的重组分案之后两个月，另一家汽车配件生产商终于结束了它漫长的重组。位于密歇根的Meridian Automotive System公司有4700雇员，在2005年初申请破产保护。通过发行无追索权债券，Meridian取得大约485百万美元的一级和二级抵押贷款。
For a restructuring deal to go through, it has to be approved by a majority (defined differently in different countries) of each “class” of creditor. Some of Meridian's biggest creditors were hedge funds which held a lot of first- and second-lien debt and in effect had a blocking vote in both classes. Contentious negotiations ensued over, among other things, the financing of the company through bankruptcy. In the end, a deal was struck which essentially handed more to second-lien lenders than they might otherwise have been entitled to. The entire bankruptcy took 20 months.
只有得到各级多数债权人的批准，重组交易才能进行。Meridian最大的债权人有一些是对冲基金，持有大量的一、二级抵押债务并能够代表这两个级别的债权人进行投票。随之讨价还价的结束，企业的融资问题贯穿整个重组过程。在最后，由于第一债权人侵犯第二债权人应得的利益，重组受到很大影响。整个破产过程用了20个月。
Meridian is hardly unique. As David Resnick, an investment banker with Rothschild in New York, points out: “Many hedge funds now invest 'strategically', often buying up large chunks of different parts of a company's capital structure, so as to be well positioned when that company needs to restructure or files for bankruptcy.” To complicate matters even more, some creditors, having bought insurance against default, may make more if the restructuring fails than if it succeeds. Since the debt of such companies is easily traded, those around the table can often change, even as a plan is being debated.
像Meridian这样的例子有很多。就像罗斯柴尔德在纽约的投资银行家大卫·瑞史尼克所指出的：“很多对冲基金的投资是战略性的。它们大量买入企业资本结构的各部分的份额，当企业面临重组或申请破产时，它们就能以高姿态参与其中。为了让事情更加复杂，有些债权人还会买入企业违约保险，一旦企业的重组方案失败，他们就能得到比重组成功更多的利益。由于这些企业的债务能够随意交易，所以参与到企业重组的投资者经常变换，即便正在讨论重组方案的时候。
When a deal cannot be struck, creditors may simply attempt to snatch control of the company. This happened in the battle over a European consumer-goods company earlier this year, according to a lawyer who knows the case. When the company ran into trouble, talks broke down between the hedge funds that owned a lot of its debt and the big private-equity firm that owned its shares, which refused to buy out the lenders. The hedge funds threatened to use the courts to take control of the firm's assets and sell them to a shell company wholly owned by them, leaving the private-equity firm with nothing. The private-equity firm retaliated by warning investment banks that they would be blacklisted if they funded the creditors. Faced with the risk of losing the company (an American bank was willing to take the risk), the private-equity firm agreed to a buy-out of creditors anyway. This drama took nine months.
当企业重组成为板上钉钉的事，债权人就会试图去取得企业的控制权。今年年初，欧洲一个消费品公司重组时就出现了上述情况——某个参与其中的律师透露。当那家公司陷入困境时，持有该公司大量债权的对冲基金和持有该公司股权的私人资本投资公司之间的谈判也陷入僵局，因为那家私人资本投资公司拒绝买断对冲基金的债权。于是对冲基金威胁要利用法律取得企业资产的控制权，然后将企业卖给他们全资拥有的壳公司，让那家私人资本投资公司什么也得不到。私人资本投资公司不甘示弱，展开报复。它警告投资银行不得给予债权人资金支持，不然将被他列入黑名单。不过面对失去企业的风险（一家美国银行同意借钱给对冲基金），那家私人资本投资公司最终同意买断债权。这场闹剧上演了九个月。
Disagreements among creditors can be costlier still. Talks among creditors of American Remanufacturers, a third car-parts firm, broke down when second-lien lenders claimed that first-lien lenders could not finance the company through bankruptcy without their permission. The court agreed with them. Since the price for such permission would almost certainly have been equal treatment of both classes, the first-lien lot walked away, leaving the company with no money. It was shut down and its assets were sold. Neither set of lenders was paid more than a pittance.
债权人之间的分歧会加大重组的费用。American Remanufacturers（第三家汽车配件生产商）债权人的谈判也一度险入僵局，因为第二顺位债权人声称，没有他们的允许，第一顺位债权人不能以申请破产的形式为企业融资。法院也同意了他们的诉求。因为这个允许的代价肯定会对双方造成相同的损害，很多有资产第一处置权的债权人干脆撒手不管。企业失去了资金来源，只好关闭变卖资产。所有的债权人谁都不比谁多得到一个子儿。
The demise of American Remanufacturers was swift. Just 11 days after its Chapter 11 filing, it became clear that the company would have to be liquidated. But this example, like that of the European consumer-goods company, illustrates both the tactics creditors use and the consequences when they misfire. In an analysis for the American Bankruptcy Institute, Mark Berman of Nixon Peabody, a law firm, remarks: “An observer has opined that the first- and second lien-holders took out their guns and shot each other. From any perspective, it is hard to understand who won or who benefited by the result achieved in this case.”
American Remanufacturers的消亡极其迅速。在它申请破产之后11天，企业就只能面对被清算的局面。这个例子和上面那个欧洲消费品公司的例子，既阐明了债权人使用的手段，也给出了战术失败后的后果。Nixon Peabody律师事务所的Mark Berman在美国破产协会的一份研究分析上写道：“观察者认为，拥有优先处置权和次优处置权的债权人会利用手中的权利互不相让。这个例子的结果，从任何角度去看，都很难了解到底是谁胜出了还是谁获利了。”
Amid all the threats and tactics, the health of the company is often forgotten. “With so many parties, a lot of time goes in just managing differences and arguing over how to cut the cake rather than figuring out how to increase the size of it,” says Stephen Taylor, of AlixPartners, a restructuring firm, who managed Schefenacker through its bankruptcy.
所有的威胁和手段都没有考虑到公司的情况。史蒂芬·泰勒说，“很多的债权人只顾着消除分歧，商量怎么划分蛋糕，而不是考虑如何去做大那个蛋糕。”史蒂芬·泰勒来自主持秀弗莱克重组事宜的AlixPartners公司。
The big restructurings of a few years ago—WorldCom and Eurotunnel, for instance—tended to be those of companies with billions of dollars in debt and assets. Only rarely did businesses of Schefenacker's or Meridian's size have to endure long insolvencies. Many such firms cannot afford to. They may end up among the walking dead.
那些负债数以十亿计的公司正在重蹈几年前重大重组事件——比如WorldCom和Eurotunnel——的覆辙。像雪弗莱克和Meridian那种规模的公司，很少是迫不得已才会遭受长期的破产过程。很多这样的公司根本就遭不起那样的折腾。他们很可能只能眼睁睁束手待毙。
很无奈,发了几次贴子都是这样。
Well over下面的内容都显示不出来。预览的时候还是好好的，一按编辑就变成这个样了了。
已上传附件。
中午再来看看，如果还是这样，只能删贴了。:Q :Q
欧元符号问题：如何解决欧元符号问题
因论坛本身限制，无法正常显示欧元符号。因此凡是帖子中有欧元符号的地方，请替换为&euro&，否则欧元后面的内容不能正常发布
商榷之处：
我觉得文章的意思是说有些进行重组的公司实际上已经死翘翘了，所以虽然在walking，但其实是dead了，用 束手待毙 好像不太合适
副标题用 吃力不讨好 好像也不太妥当，因为不存在谁讨好谁的问题，似乎将complex, contentious and costly直译出来更切题
第六段a good proportion of creditors will be left with nothing 很大一部分债权人（在清算之后）什么也得不到
第三部分第二段It rarely makes sense to buy at that high a price for them to be satisfied with being paid off only at par [the full value of the bond] 以高价买入债券而只获得票面收益对他们来说毫无意义
第三部分第七段to be well positioned 处在有利地位
从行文内容看，作者使用insolvent和bankrupt好像还是有所区别的
S&P LCD应该是标准普尔公司内部的一个研究部门
美国又要出现经济危机了。。。。
美国出现经济危机会连累整个地球。现在基本上的说法是：存在经济危机，但不大可能出现上世纪70年代的经济大萧条。基本还算是乐观。只是经济发展速度放慢（全球性的）。
Changes to bankruptcy laws in both America and Europe in recent years ought to have made it easier to revitalise or kill off ailing companies. But companies' finances have become much harder to unravel. Offered cheap money on easy terms, companies—just like consumers and homeowners—have borrowed far more than they used to. The type and complexity of debt have grown too, as have the range and number of creditors.
这一段为什么没有译出，麻烦哪位帮忙把它补上？谢谢。
刚才试着翻译了一下，如下，（不懂经济类的文章，请大家指出错误，这是周刊的文章，有点急！)
近年来在美国与欧洲对《破产法》所做出的修订本应该让濒临破产的企业更容易复苏或直接灭绝。但是，企业的财政情况现在变得越来越难理清楚。各个企业通过简易条款而获得了低息贷款，这些企业也像客户与私房屋主那样比以前的贷款要多得多。此外，贷款的类型与复杂性也出现激增，正如债权人的职责范围与数量激增那样。
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